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Abstract 
Communication links are a key dimension for implementation of European Union (EU) 
policies in non-member states because EU influence abroad is otherwise severely hindered. 
Exploring project implementation of external migration policy in Morocco and Ukraine 
highlights the role of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees and particularly the 
International Organisation for Migration for bridging and exploiting communication gaps 
between administrations in Brussels and ‘the field’. Linking the Europeanization literature 
with insights on implementation, organisational sociology and social networks raises attention 
to the ‘grapevine’ of interorganisational communication structures that mediates EU influence 
and reveals manifold actor influence in Europeanization processes and on policy output 
beyond EU control. 
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Introduction 
Although Europeanization studies in EU accession countries have gained prominence with the 
2004 and 2007 enlargement rounds (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005; Bache 2010), the 
influence of EU policies in non-member states (NMS) has been largely neglected and requires 
theorising that accounts for differences from accession and member states (Schimmelfennig 
2009). This article addresses this gap and simultaneously links it with insights from the 
literature on implementation, organisational sociology and social networks. If 
Europeanization is ultimately about EU impact on processes and policy output then it should 
be linked with the implementation literature as an established area of public policy research 
that deals with how policy is “translated” into “action”. The link is theoretically useful and 
points at an area of study where EU influence becomes most tangible in form of EU projects 
set in time and space. Furthermore, it allows insulating direct from indirect forms of EU 
influence as well as from non-EU driven change such as socialisation and lesson-drawing 
(Schimmelfennig 2009: p.8). Direct EU influence is therefore understood as the EU’s ability 
to successfully pursue its policy objectives through implementation of its projects and 
programmes in NMS. Better analytical focus becomes possible on unfolding Europeanization 
processes in a ‘controlled environment’ to provide insights into a new area that might 
otherwise be obfuscated by their complexity (Zahariadis 2008: p.223).  
In contrast to accession and member states, EU policy implementation in NMS is 
more limited. The EU operates external policies outside of its legal reach, without sanctioning 
system, lacking substantial incentives, meaningful conditionality and administrative 
capabilities while simultaneously facing uncertainties about the appropriate means to shape 
the implementation target “international migration”, about its scale and “logics”. This setting 
creates a gap between Brussels, where policy objectives are set, and the implementation 
context in NMS, where networks try to produce the intended change. Implementation 
networks emerge around EU policy objectives, are composed of governmental, international 
and non-governmental organisations, have a polycentric structure and are stable beyond the 
normal three-year lifecycle of individual EU projects.  
Already the 2007 multi-presidency work programme for the external relations of EU 
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) mentions 37 times the words ‘implementation’, 
‘implementing’ and ‘implement’ in an only 21 page document (Council 2007). The 
Stockholm Programme, which sets the most current EU framework for this area, shows 
continuing concern about policy implementation and identifies the need for greater 
coordination and dialogue with NMS regarding migration issues (Council 2009). How do EU 
implementation networks bridge the gap between Brussels and NMS and address 
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uncertainties? Who profits form this constellation and why? What does this mean for EU 
influence on policy output and our understanding of Europeanization processes in NMS?  
It is argued that communication links, understood as formal or informal inter-
organisational communication channels that transmit expert knowledge regarding 
implementation, are the crucial dimension in EU implementation networks and help to 
address these uncertainties. Although network relations are multi-dimensional, 
communication links are a precondition for other inter-organisational relations at large and 
Europeanization processes in specific. While states ultimately set policy objectives and 
regulate migration, the grapevine of communication links in implementation networks allows 
interpreting and translating objectives into “action”, allocating funding and attributing 
legitimacy to projects. Analysing communication links should therefore provide central 
understanding of Europeanization processes in NMS. Findings show that implementers are 
largely undisturbed by EU policy-makers when driving Europeanization processes abroad. 
Implementation of policy objectives can become dependent on often overlooked non-state 
actors in this communication grapevine such as international organisations (IOs) that provide 
central communication links across the EU outer border and can facilitate or compromise 
implementation. Consequently, policy is shaped along the way rather than following a 
template set in Brussels and EU influence can become obscured in this interactive process. 
External migration policy presents an interesting case for studying Europeanization as 
a EU priority for its ‘neighbourhood’. The EU has hierarchical intentions in this internally 
motivated external policy field. This means it aims at restricting migration movements into its 
territory through external cooperation and does not differentiate its policy objectives much 
between European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) countries. Apart from decentralised funding 
to NMS agencies, the Commission has implemented centralised thematic instruments under 
implementation since 2001. If the implementation of centrally managed programmes in a EU 
priority policy area does not correspond to a hierarchical process then Europeanization is 
unlikely to be controlled by Brussels in other external policy areas where programmes are 
decentralised or seen as less important. 
Drawing upon 59 interviews in Brussels, Morocco and Ukraine, this article uses social 
network analysis (SNA) to examine country cases that are EU targets of substantial external 
migration projects and that are explicitly left without membership perspective – thus making 
them novel ground for Europeanization studies. The paper is structured as follows: Section 1 
adapts findings of the Europeanization literature to NMS contexts; section 2 supplements 
them with the literature on implementation, social networks and organisational sociology; 
section 3 visualises concrete examples of communication structures around implementation of 
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EU external migration policy; finally, section 4 theorises the role of IOs with a detailed 
analysis of links of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the United 
Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) with EU and NMS actors as well as their 
influence on Europeanization processes.  
 
Theorising Europeanization in non-member states 
EU influence on polity, policy and politics at domestic level has been conceptualised as 
Europeanization and provides a substantive field of scholarly literature (see for example 
Graziano & Vink 2006). The literature has established a range of domestic responses to 
accommodate EU influence (Börzel & Risse 2003: pp.69-70), which indicates the underlying 
interpretation processes at domestic level. Similarly implementation research stresses that 
policy is not set in stone at the point of decision-making but undergoes challenging processes 
that can drive policy output away from original intentions (for an overview of the 
implementation literature see Hill and Hupe 2002). Indeed Europeanization research found 
that interpretation helps translating policies into national contexts and policies are at times 
deliberately vague for that purpose (Mörth 2003). Accounts of domestic ‘fit’ and ‘misfit’ with 
adaptational pressure from the EU level seem inadequate (Mastenbroek and Kaeding 2006) 
and Europeanization models should accommodate the interpretation and communication 
processes of organisations. Research has confirmed particularly the importance of 
administrative capacities and veto players on the one side and willingness of domestic actors 
on the other for Europeanization processes (Treib 2008: 10-11, 17). Besides domestic factors, 
the literature on member and accession countries highlights the importance of EU ‘modes of 
governance’ (Bulmer & Radaelli 2004; Knill & Lehmkuhl 1999). In contrast, directed EU 
influence in NMS will be less dependent on what “comes down” from the EU level due to 
three limitations: 
(1) EU external policies are outside the reach of the EU legal framework, which binds 
member states to implement directives and regulations. In contrast to accession countries 
that need to transpose all EU policies as a precondition for membership, other states are 
under no such obligation.  
(2) In the accession process, substantial incentives are the central ‘mechanism’ for 
Europeanization with membership as the ultimate reward (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 
2005). The ENP was created as the most similar framework to membership on offer for 
NMS. However, it ‘lacks any substantial incentives…’ and has therefore ‘been deprived of 
any substantial leverage’ (Whitman and Wolff 2010: p.13). Although some incentives such 
  
4 
as visa facilitation agreements are on the table to achieve policy change in NMS (Trauner 
& Kruse 2008), these incentives are too ‘chunky’ to be used in a fine-grained manner that 
corresponds with the complex realities of implementing numerous individual projects.  
(3) The EU has no sanctioning mechanism towards NMS that compares with that of the 
Commission and European Court of Justice in the case of member states or with the threat 
of withholding membership from accession countries. Although the Council of the 
European Union (2002: 11) stated that ‘an unjustified lack of cooperation in the joint 
management of migration flows’ can lead to unspecified penal measures, this procedure 
has never been applied. Non-compliance did not lead to EU sanctions because individual 
Commission Directorate Generals (DGs) were protecting their portfolios from 
contamination by other DG’s policy objectives and broader foreign policy interests 
prevailed over migration policy interests even in this priority area (Wunderlich 2010: 266-
267). This reflects a broader picture of inconsistent application of conditionality in NMS 
(Schimmelfennig 2009: p.16). 
 
These limitations of EU influence in NMS underscore the role of communication links in the 
implementation context. Organisational sociology helps to conceptualise the role of 
communication for implementing organisations to make sense of their environment. 
The role of communication links in implementation networks of EU external policies 
The basic proposition that communication structures are central to implementation finds 
support in the literature on organisational sociology. Any organisation that wants to act 
purposefully in its environment needs to be able to make sense of what is going on around it 
(Daft & Weick 1984). Since the implementation of EU policies depends on cooperation 
because the EU does not possess administrative authority in NMS, implementers need to be 
able to (a) make sense of the policy object “migration”, (b) identify capable cooperation 
partners and (c) achieve enough mutual understanding to follow through with joint projects. 
However, addressing these challenges is difficult. Boswell (2009: 170) describes migration as 
a challenging policy target marked ‘by uncertainty over [the] scale and consequences, as well 
as controversy over the appropriate means’ to act on it. Lacking or mismatching migration 
policy approaches in western European countries of immigration in contrast to countries of 
emigration and transit indicate that organisational structures are not likely to correspond 
across the EU outer border. Although communication links cannot overcome the identified 
limitations of EU influence in NMS, they play a crucial role where overarching authority is 
lacking and uncertainty is great. For example, communication links are necessary to establish 
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how to allocate and control EU funding, exert authority or legitimate action. They help to 
introduce EU policy objectives, spread problem perceptions as well as different approaches to 
dealing with them.  
The importance of adequate administrative capacities is well established in the 
Europeanization and implementation literature (Treib 2008: p.11) and is particularly relevant 
for organisational sense-making and communication where interaction is less established as 
across EU borders. Qualified staff needs to have time and resources to establish and maintain 
communication networks. Relevant information on appropriate approaches, available 
resources and cooperation partners needs to be identified and processed for informed 
decision-making to fit the local context.  
In contrast to top-down approaches that assume a hierarchical “implementation chain” 
that under the right conditions could perfectly translate a political decision into a matching 
outcome (Sabatier & Mazmanian 1979; Gunn 1978), bottom-up approaches dismiss the 
notion that implementers are mere tools in the hands of political actors. These studies point at 
pressures and uncertainties that affect implementers (Lipsky 1971; Brunsson 1989) who are 
mainly concerned about how to create feasible interventions with restricted resources and fit 
them to a local context while strengthening their position vis-à-vis other organisations. 
Implementation is consequently a dynamic and inherently political process of negotiation 
between actors as in Barrett and Fudge’s (1981: p.4) understanding of a ‘policy-action 
relationship’ in which policy objectives are interpreted, modified and in some cases 
subverted. Accordingly, the existence of EU external policy objectives says little about 
whether or how they are put into practice (Bicchi 2010; Wunderlich 2010). 
Europeanization processes can alter opportunity structures and lead to ‘differential 
empowerment of actors’ (Knill & Lehmkuhl 1999: p.2; Risse et al 2001: p.11). Functionally 
driven implementation networks do not guarantee that communication links are complete or 
that information circulates evenly as shown in the literature on social networks (Festinger et al 
1950). Communication gaps can be assumed within formal structures even where 
organisations are functionally relevant to each other and especially in an international setting. 
Organisations that bridge gaps are important for network communication for two reasons. (1) 
Granovetter (1983) highlights the ‘strength of weak ties’. Highly connected networks provide 
their members with little “new” information and circulating information soon becomes 
redundant. In contrast, less frequently used links between groups and with “outsiders” (‘weak 
ties’) contribute potentially relevant news as relays between them. (2) In areas with a lower 
density of inter-organisational links, information is scarce and communication gaps can 
persist over time between groups as ‘structural holes’. Those organisations that bridge 
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structural holes can become information hubs or brokers of rare information between both 
sides (Burt 2001: pp.208-211). Brokers pass on information to where it is in demand, where it 
benefits their own interests and strengthens their position in the network. Communication 
structures and the behaviour of relays and brokers should have an important role in shaping 
Europeanization processes.  
Much like communication between the trenches depended on the ‘grapevine’ of 
telegraph wires which were strung around branches and transmitted garbled messages during 
the US-American Civil War, the translation of EU policy objectives into action in NMS 
depends on (1) the structure of communication links in implementation networks and (2) 
organisations’ capabilities to acquire, process and employ information for their purposes. 
Insights that communication links are central to reducing uncertainty for EU policy 
interventions in NMS combined with bottom-up accounts that implementers have 
considerable leeway during the process suggest a closer look at the networks and their central 
actors. SNA allows searching implementation networks for those organisations that combine 
capabilities with crucial communication links across the EU outer border and assessing their 
influence over the implementation process and policy development. The following sections 
use quantitative and qualitative SNA to identify opportunity structures, such as ‘structural 
holes’, and potential veto players, relays and brokers within implementation networks. This 
opens sight to network structures as a whole beyond a narrow focus on individual actors’ 
relations (Marin & Wellman 2010). SNA hereby responds to demands in the Europeanization 
literature to account for structural and agential factors although it emphasises actors’ relations 
over their properties.  
 
Implementation networks of EU external migration policy 
EU external migration policy developed from the 1999 European Council in Tampere in 
response to shortcomings of Union policies to control immigration and asylum (Boswell 
2003). Its general policy objectives have since been refined and updated in multi-annual 
programmes, lately in Stockholm (CEU 2009), and backed by around €1billion of EU-funding 
between 2001 and 2010 plus another €175million until 2013 (CEC 2006: pp.6-10; 2010: 
p.143).  
Especially in its relations with neighbouring countries, migration policy has become a 
EU priority. Its hierarchical intentions mean that policy objectives are relatively 
undifferentiated between NMS in this internally motivated external policy field. Multi-annual 
action plans state objectives like improving asylum systems, strengthening border control 
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capacities, enhancing document security, readmission programmes and limited initiatives to 
cooperate on labour migration and linking migration and development policy. Even in 
Morocco where the EU programme is broadest and touches lightly on migration and 
development and labour migration initiatives that are not addressed in Ukraine, it follows the 
aim to restrict migration into EU member states (Wunderlich 2010: pp.254-260). The 
undifferentiated nature of EU policy objectives also reflects in the structure of the 
implementation network as illustrated in Figure 1. The policy content seems to have little 
effect on the Brussels side of communication links in the implementation network for 
different NMS as portrayed in the case of Ukraine and Morocco.  
Interpreting network structures as the one in Figure 1 make further methodological 
considerations necessary. The visualisation of implementation networks through SNA 
software homogenises ties between different actors in form and content and presents them as 
static. Although the situation at the time of data collection may be overrepresented, the 
visualised network is not a “snapshot” because inter-organisational relations are relatively 
stable and EU project implementation lasts more than three years. Notwithstanding its 
limitations the method has the benefit of making networks tangible, casting the view beyond 
individual relations and evaluating inter-organisational relations within the network as a 
whole (Marin & Wellman 2010). Qualitative accounts of network interactions allow context 
sensitive interpretation of social networks (Hollstein 2010: pp.17-18). While quantitative 
SNA helps to highlight central relationships within the overall network, semi-structured 
interviews with network members provides systematic and substantial accounts of how actors 
perceived inter-organisational relations that were contrasted with each other to help interpret 
quantitative accounts.1 
Figure 1 shows that the communication links in implementation network to Ukraine 
and Morocco are largely split along administrative authority. The EU’s links with both 
countries do not obviously differ despite different political and migration patterns. DG 
EuropeAid Co-operation Office (AIDCO) occupies a central position as the main 
implementation arm and financial watchdog for external cooperation programmes. It is 
responsible for centrally managed instruments such as B7-667, AENEAS and the Thematic 
Programme for Migration and Asylum that allow targeted migration projects abroad. DG 
AIDCO functions as information hub between former DG Freedom, Security and Justice 
(JLS) as the lead DG for external migration policy with a unit of nine officers and DG 
External Relations (RELEX) responsible for external relations and the networks of 112 
Commission Delegations on the one side and implementers in NMS on the other side. Given 
its administrative capacities and role to programme, co-
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ordinate and control EU external project output DG AIDCO is more central to the network 
than DGs RELEX and JLS, who are primarily concerned with policy development but have 
little involvement in implementation. Other DGs are only involved in policy input and 
peripheral to communication links in the network such as DGs Development (because of its 
geographical remit) and Employment (as an almost exclusively internal DG).2 Non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and think tanks in Brussels are sidelined. In contrast, 
Delegations are clearly visible as relays between the political DGs RELEX and JLS with 
Moroccan and Ukrainian state actors some of whom directly liaise with DG AIDCO through 
individual EU projects. The position of member states and IOs stand out as additional insights 
from the visualised network. 
Member state actors are marginal without direct connection to either implementers in 
NMS or at EU level apart from links with DGs RELEX and JLS as the central policy 
developers. In fact, policy experts in the Commission confirmed that member states lack 
overview of funds and instruments available at EU level and their attention to migration 
issues is geographically and thematically selective.3 Council DG JHA is similarly marginal to 
the network than member states’ permanent representations. Given that there are only three 
migration experts in Council DG JHA, they focus on the preparation of decisions and not on 
implementation.4 This confirms the notion that policy-makers such as member states’ interior 
  
9 
ministries focus more on decision-making than following up their decisions and subsequent 
action (Brunsson 1989). Implementers in the Commission are thus far largely undisturbed by 
EU policy-makers when implementing projects and driving Europeanization processes 
abroad.  
A surprising insight is the high connectedness of specialised IOs in Brussels and with 
actors in NMS. Not embedded in the administrative structures on either side but operating 
between them, IOM and UNHCR are not only relays or information hubs. They are also 
potential communication brokers in the network with best access to information and the 
capacity to use it for their own interests. In terms of degree centrality, IOM’s Brussels office 
is well positioned to gain information from all sides with 96 percent of all possible 
communication links to other actors in the network. UNHCR’s EU office has 78 percent of 
possible links in comparison to 81 percent for DG AIDCO and 56 for DG JLS as the next 
highest. In terms of betweenness centrality, 37 percent of all attempts of network actors to 
connect with one another through established communication channels would have to go via 
IOM (UNHCR 14 percent, DG AIDCO 16 percent, DG JLS 5 percent) which indicates their 
potential for brokerage (on centrality concepts see Freeman 1979). Since visualisation and 
quantifications can only indicate actors’ relative importance, their relations and effects on the 
implementation process and policy output are scrutinised in more detail below. The following 
sections analyse communication links in Brussels and non-member states before turning to 
alternative links through IOs. 
 
Assessing the grapevine: Communication links in EU external migration policy 
Communication links of Commission Directorates General and non-member 
states 
Commission Delegations and DGs are limited in their capacity to establish and exploit 
communication links to counter uncertainty about the implementation context. Delegations 
programme yearly cooperation with state actors, liaise with implementers, monitor and 
evaluate projects. Although Delegations are the Commission’s sensors and mouthpieces vis-à-
vis national authorities, they largely rely on the implementation capacity and information 
from their NMS counterparts for what are challenging, complex and large scale interventions 
to regulate migration flows or run functioning asylum systems. However, with one policy 
officer supported by a couple of project administrators, Delegations’ capacities are limited for 
JHA matters (out of which migration policy is only one alongside other priority areas such as 
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counterterrorism and organised crime).5  
In Brussels, Commission DG JLS is jointly responsible with DGs RELEX and 
AIDCO to analyse the migration situation, identify opportunities for cooperation and approve 
project proposals from state agencies, NGOs and IOs. However, DGs JLS and AIDCO lack 
funding and staff capacities to visit NMS, identify possible cooperation partners, participate in 
bilateral negotiations or monitor projects. Despite occasional email or telephone contact with 
Delegations,6 continuous information filters otherwise through DG RELEX, whose broad 
vision of relations with NMS makes migration not its main focus.  
The installation of migration contact points and specialised staff circulating between 
DGs (as observed during this research project) should strengthen communication links at the 
Commission level. Furthermore, country migration profiles were first introduced as tools to 
address information gaps with sociological and economic data in 2005. Seemingly-targeted 
Europeanization processes are however based on mere paper reports rather than a thorough 
understanding of the complex institutional and volatile migration situation themselves. 
Therefore, feedback is hindered and existing monitoring and evaluation reports do not usually 
inform the Commission’s programming of interventions due to limited staff capacities.7 
Despite the functional need for information, communication gaps emerge even in 
integrated formal structures such as the Commission and make it difficult to address the 
complex implementation context in NMS. This problem occurred in 2008 when the EU failed 
to fund a follow-up project to improve the Moroccan asylum service although the 2007 
agreement between Morocco and UNHCR offered the opportunity to improve lacking state 
assistance and address asylum-seekers’ needs after more than five years of struggle. The 
Delegation in Rabat communicated substantial shortcomings in the asylum system to its 
headquarters. However, Brussels simply assumed that the agreement itself would resolve 
these shortcomings instead of supporting the continuing implementation of its objectives.8 
Coordination issues between Rabat and Brussels with inadequate feedback and follow-up can 
hence seriously undermine EU objectives.  
The effect of the Lisbon Treaty on this constellation is uncertain although two 
particular changes raise concerns. Seconded national staff from member states will be 
working in the new European External Action Service alongside Commission staff in the 
Delegations. While national staff could raise member states’ interest in policy 
implementation, this would presuppose that the member state’s interest in migration relates to 
the respective NMS. Where a national focus on EU implementation emerges, functioning 
internal communication structures would have to transmit relevant insights to the responsible 
level of decision-making. Furthermore, the ENP became part of the remit of DG Enlargement 
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and is no longer in the portfolio of DG RELEX, which heads the Delegations. Where more 
actors become involved previously observed tensions between foreign and sectoral policy 
concerns are likely to multiply and can further complicate existing communication flows. 
Since the situation differs between NMS, findings about communication links in EU 
implementation networks towards Morocco and Ukraine can only be indicative. The literature 
identifies administrative capabilities, structures and coordination between relevant NMS 
actors as important mediating factors for EU policy transfer (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 
2009: 804). Where the EU aims at or depends on cooperation with state agencies (such as on 
asylum procedures, border controls or readmission), central political actors need to approve 
cooperation. In Morocco, international cooperation depends on the hegemonic Interior 
Ministry that controls the policy field and other state organisations that might question its 
migrant control agenda. However, the Ministry’s control of the security apparatus can be 
effectively mobilised once cooperation is agreed. With respect to irregular migration, this has 
led to restrictive control measures including various expulsions of migrants to Algeria and 
Mauritania since 2005. In Ukraine in contrast, inter-organisational competition marks a 
disjointed setup of state actors without meaningful coordination. The Ukrainian asylum 
service and Interior Ministry are in competition with each other and weak administrative 
structures and coordination issues caused the asylum system to collapse in 2007. Formal veto 
players such as the Finance Ministry – responsible for countersigning EU programming 
agreements – do not hold migration policy expertise. Policy expertise, capacities and effective 
coordination in NMS are hence crucial for checking migration dynamics, EU budget 
attributions and policy coherence “on the ground”.9 
Despite the significant shortcomings mentioned above, communication gaps might be 
‘smaller’ in the European ‘neighbourhood’ where EU and individual member states’ relations 
with NMS are ‘denser’ and actors are more knowledgeable regarding the implementation 
context than with countries further afield. However given that migration is a cross-border 
phenomenon and that EU concerns run particularly high regarding illegal migration, the level 
of interdependence with neighbouring countries is correspondingly higher and so is EU 
interest regarding migration projects. In consequence, communication gaps with neighbours 
are likely to matter more for projects from a EU perspective than with other NMS. 
 
Alternative communication links: the role of international organisations 
Only rarely is the role of IOs conceptualised for Europeanization processes in NMS. The EU 
mobilises IOs to increase the legitimacy of its interventions. However, IOs are not only 
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‘agents of EU-ization’ as implementers of EU projects because they depend on member 
states’ funding. IOs are also balancing EU advances through their mandates and broader 
membership including sending and transit countries of migrants to the EU (Lavenex 2007). 
As established organisations with their own agendas, IOs can also act autonomously beyond 
the delegated authority of their member states (Barnett & Finnemore 2004; Loescher 2001). 
Regarding implementation processes, IOs’ roles are best described as agents and catalysts of 
Europeanization. 
In order for IOs to become communication relays and/or brokers within an 
implementation network certain external and internal conditions need to be fulfilled. The 
previous section highlighted that a lack of effective communication links between relevant 
EU and NMS actors creates structural holes in the network. Lack of expertise and 
coordination between NMS actors as well as limited capacities and information deficits in 
Delegations and Commission headquarters worsen their effects. Consequently, structural 
holes between the EU and NMS actors provide opportunities for alternative communication 
links to inform EU policy implementation and reduce uncertainties. In order for IOs to bridge 
structural holes, they need extensive administrative resources that allow information gathering 
at all end and strategic communication links for implementation.  
Since organisations are concerned with their own survival, IOs are not only interested 
in legitimising their actions and responding to their mandates and members’ demands. IOs are 
also proactive to maintain and where possible expand their overall capacities (e.g. staff, 
representations, areas of activity, finances) so that they can improve their possibilities to exist 
into the future. Daily activities can hereby become ‘decoupled’ from their original mandates 
(Meyer & Rowan 1977). 
The following analysis focuses on IOM and UNHCR as the main IOs in the policy 
field and EU implementation network to exemplify how they can bridge structural holes and 
use inter-organisational communication links for their own interests. UNHCR gets involved in 
asylum capacity-building or providing status examinations while organising legal support and 
other direct services to asylum-seekers with help of local NGOs. IOM engages in diverse 
areas such as border management, anti-trafficking, labour market programmes and diaspora 
relations. Although both organisations have acquired a crucial role for EU external migration 
policy in bringing funding, expertise, beneficiaries and implementers together since the late 
1990, IOM’s broader and more flexible mandate as well as its superior administrative 
capacities make it more “successful” than UNHCR. 
The Commission was IOM’s fourth largest funding body, contributing 
US$63.9million or eight percent of its operational budget in 2009.10 Given that 96.5 percent 
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of IOM’s budget is based on project funding, the following statement of an IOM official 
squares: ‘We rely on EU-funding. Offices can be opened or closed depending on the 
operational budget coming in’.11 Financial dependence ensures that communication links to 
the Commission do not break off and that IOM is not too critical of EU policy objectives. It 
interprets both its mission statement and EU objectives broadly to make it not only a flexible 
service provider to its donors but also a proactive seeker of funding opportunities to expand 
its activities and sustain its staff. With US$126.1million, the Commission is also UNHCR’s 
second largest donor in 2009 corresponding to 8.0 percent of its governmental donor 
contributions.12 Despite financial dependence for its operations, UNHCR can claim a more 
independent standing vis-à-vis the EU as guardian of the 1951 Geneva Convention and its 
1967 protocol. 
IOM and UNHCR bridge structural communication holes between state actors in 
NMS, NGOs and EU organisations by means of their widespread representations in almost 
every country on the globe. Their networks provide supreme access to information and links 
to the EU, governmental and non-governmental actors. With 460 field missions and 7,000 
staff implementing 2,360 projects worldwide in 2010 following its official website, IOM is 
the policy specialist. IOM’s extensive capacities in comparison to UNHCR and the 
Commission become apparent in Ukraine where it has 120 staff compared with 20 for 
UNHCR and only one JHA expert at the Delegation. Neither member states with their limited 
embassy staff and limited geographical experience nor NGOs can match IOM’s capacity and 
expertise. How do these capacities play out for IOM and UNHCR in the implementation 
networks? What effect do they have on policy output and the implementation process? 
 
International organisations between Brussels…  
Information gathering through IOM’s and UNHCR’s global networks helps to follow local 
developments, design project proposals and set up joint operations. They broaden their 
existing experience in terms of approaches, procedures, local context and contacts and build 
up ever more expert knowledge that they can feed through their communication links into the 
implementation process. Representations in Brussels help IOM and UNHCR to carry their 
policy proposals straight into the centre of the network to the Commission. Personal networks 
are also fostered by recruitment of Commission officials to their Brussels representations as I 
observed in various cases. When UNHCR and IOM are invited to provide advice and 
expertise to EU institutions, this provides feedback loops between their experience in 
implementation and EU policy development. For example, IOM runs EU-funded ‘trial’ 
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versions of circular labour migration between Columbia and Spain since 2007. 
Professional and personal networks build up expertise about the complex competitive 
EU bidding system and implementation requirements that many NGOs are lacking. Since 
considerable administrative and financial resources are needed for the 18-month application 
process with an average success rate of one in six, established communication links with 
major donor governments make it easier for IOM and UNHCR to mobilise the required 20 
percent of co-financing for EU projects.13 Their superior communication links therefore 
provide them with advantages that fit with the Commission’s preference for dealing with 
“more professional” and financially secure organisations as evaluation reports reveal (ECRE 
2008: 18-19). Consequently, between 2001 and 2006 IOM and UNHCR secured every third 
project under thematic instruments of external migration policy in competitive bidding. 
Approximately 120 NGOs, IOs and other governmental agencies were left to share the rest of 
the funding amongst each other.  
IOM’s pro-activeness and broker role paired with the Commission’s disconnectedness 
from implementation in NMS produce at times unease amongst its staff and national donors.14 
These reservations are based on the Commission’s apparent lack of control over implemented 
action and its dependence on IOM for project implementation because no other competitor 
has comparable communication links and access to resources in order to can carry out 
comparatively elaborate migration interventions in NMS.15 IOM’s proactiveness becomes 
apparent in the wide interpretation of its mandate. For example, IOM is providing support to 
EU Election Observation Missions in NMS. In order to justify these activities, IOM 
constructs complex narratives that election support activities help democratisation and peace-
building, contribute to economic development and ultimately increase the engagement of 
diasporas and incentivise their return. In conclusion, the reader learns that election support 
enhances migration management (IOM n.d.) in an apparent attempt to link ‘decoupled’ 
practices to its widely interpreted mandate (Meyer & Rowan 1977). 
In contrast, UNHCR’s mandate as guardian of international refugee law make the EU 
receptive for critical comments because it provides legitimacy at the planning stage and 
valuable first-hand information (Klaauw 2002). However, even UNHCR’s direct 
communication links to Brussels do not guarantee mutual understanding and the 
Commission’s lack of exposure to direct information from NMS can cause unrealistic 
expectations about project feasibility. For example, the EU-funded project 'Improving asylum 
management' in Ukraine had the aim to improve legislation and reception facilities in line 
with international standards, to train officials and to provide an asylum database. While the 
Commission claimed that UNHCR did not deliver and considered the project a failure, 
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underlying obstacles to implementation were: (1) UNHCR’s draft legislation was not tabled in 
the Ukrainian parliament; (2) high turnover in state agencies hindered staff training; (3) 
property disputes between ministries made planned facilities unavailable; and (4) while 
UNHCR provided equipment, the government did not put personnel in charge to use it.16  
UNHCR’s perception of the implementation problematique is hereby interesting. 
UNHCR sees itself as a ‘mediator’ for ‘channelling funding’ and ‘not [as] the implementer of 
projects’. A senior UNHCR official stated, ‘The ultimate responsibility for implementation 
lies within the government. If the government fails to implement, the project fails. For the 
Commission, UNHCR is the implementation partner as the contracted party. For them, the 
government is the beneficiary.’17 This example underscores that organisational sense-making 
and communication are crucial for targeted Europeanization processes. Firstly, the work of 
the Delegation did not prevent that unrealistic expectations took over in Brussels. Secondly, 
monitoring and evaluation did not manage to control project output and thirdly, 
communication links between UNHCR and the Commission failed to produce mutually 
acceptable accounts about project performance and objectives. This highlights the contextual 
uncertainties as well as the complexities and interdependencies in the implementation process 
that place Europeanization processes in NMS often beyond EU control.  
 
… and non-member states 
IOM and UNHCR have officially been charged to organise and facilitate the transfer of 
experience between EU and NMS government officials. The EU finances multilateral 
consultative processes such as the Söderköping Process in Eastern Europe since 2001 hosted 
by UNHCR or the ‘5+5 Dialogue’ in the Mediterranean since 2002 hosted by IOM. These 
initiatives highlight that the EU recognises the importance of establishing and maintaining 
communication flows in a structured way. Although the effects of the Council’s (2009) call 
for greater dialogue and coordination with NMS are as yet unclear, communication gaps are 
likely to persist given the observed limitations of EU influence, new EU actors, lacking NMS 
capacities and coordination issues on both sides. EU capacity-building exercises in NMS have 
struggled to address these issues since the beginning of implementing EU external migration 
policy in 2001. The escalating migration crisis of fleeing migrant workers and asylum seekers 
from Tunisia and Libya shows the EU’s limitations regarding implementation and its reliance 
on IOM and UNHCR as central implementers to address the migration situation in NMS. 
Despite occasional communication failures, the success of IOs to bridge structural 
holes often translates into success to find funding for their own operations. For example, 
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where state actors are not willing to cooperate, the Commission invites specifically 
intermediaries such as UNHCR and IOM for ‘joint management’ of projects on its behalf.  
Far from only being reactive to Commission approaches, IOs profit from the ‘strength 
of weak ties’ (Granovetter 1983) between Brussels and NMS due to their widespread and 
fine-tuned communication links. IOM and UNHCR manage to mount projects “through the 
backdoor” that fall under EU objectives and channel EU-funding to NMS authorities and 
NGOs. Under the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument, the largest budget line for 
projects in neighbouring countries, local authorities need to launch an official request for 
cooperation. If the requested project matches the EU country strategy then financial support is 
usually granted. Local authorities are however often unaware of funding opportunities and 
procedures and therefore approach IOM for advice and consultation on designing projects.  
Cooperation with IOM also runs in the opposite direction. IOM representations 
suggest projects to local authorities that are in line with EU-funding objectives using their 
knowledge of the local context. In order to attract funding for its own representations and for 
future expansion, IOM generates interests in projects by lobbing for support from local 
authorities. For example, IOM created awareness among local authorities about “inadequate” 
medical facilities in Ukrainian asylum reception centres, proposed to fill this gap, advised 
them on the EU-funding application and carried out the project.18 Similarly, IOM held 
seminars with Moldovan authorities to explore the use of remittances and links with the 
Moldovan Diaspora in which IOM made concrete proposals such as the installation of a 
‘Ministry of Diaspora’. IOM then drafted a project for the authorities that attracted EU-
funding.19 IOM therefore introduces problem perceptions and simultaneously proposes 
solutions by means of its superior communication links that might otherwise not have ended 
up on the agenda of local actors. This underscores the importance of IOs as intermediaries in 
intergovernmental communication on migration as a base for policy transfer and socialisation 
(Thouez & Channac 2006: 384-385). In a similar vein, UNHCR contributes to spreading EU 
problem perceptions among NGOs in NMS by channelling EU-funding and engaging them in 
actions and policy objectives that they hitherto resented. The constructed nature of problem 
perceptions, solutions and interpretation of EU policy objectives puts the notion of 
objectifiable ‘fit’ and ‘misfit’ with local context in question and underlines social 
constructivist notions that IOs can fix meaning (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). 
 
Conclusions 
The NMS context poses challenges that limit EU control over implementation processes and 
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policy output more than in member and accession countries. Under these conditions, inter-
organisational communication and network structures are crucial mediating factors in 
addressing uncertainties about cooperation partners and other information deficits. Empirical 
research in the area of external migration policy shows that the structure of communication 
links opens up opportunities especially for IOs to bridge communication gaps between NMS 
and Brussels. This allows them to ‘manage’ implementation knowledge and shape output 
confirming the influence of implementers on policy. In specific, IOM and UNHCR are 
important intermediaries as relays, information hubs and brokers of Europeanization in NMS. 
The grapevine metaphor contributes to Europeanization studies because it highlights 
communication links as a precondition for implementation and sets focus on structures 
beyond the analysis of individual actor relations and the narrow realm of interactions between 
state actors. SNA provides helpful tools to identify crucial actors, trace communication 
networks and set focus on actor relations rather than properties. Implementation dynamics 
indicate that Europeanization in NMS corresponds to conceptualisations of bottom-up 
implementation as an interactive process in which policy is not set in stone in Brussels but 
constantly negotiated. Although policy objectives follow the broader direction of EU 
documents, implementers have considerable leeway to shape policy output beyond EU 
control. If this is the case in centrally managed EU programmes in a priority policy area such 
as external migration policy then Europeanization is unlikely to follow a hierarchical process 
controlled by Brussels in other external policy areas where programmes are decentralised or 
seen as less important. 
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Notes 
1 Among others, semi-structured interviews explored actors’ influence on EU implementation 
dynamics, relations with other implementers and their experience with programming, 
monitoring, evaluation and feedback. In addition, each interviewee was asked to fill in a 
survey how important they rated their links with other implementers. Interview coding was 
carried out via qualitative data software NVIVO. Interviews and survey combined provided 
data about communication links that was processed via UCINET and Netdraw for quantitative 
social network analysis. Data and copies of the interview schedule and survey are available 
from the author. 
2 In 2010, DG JLS was split into DG Justice and DG Home Affairs, which bears 
responsibility for migration policy. DG Development is responsible for policies towards 
African, Caribbean and Pacific countries while DG RELEX covers all other states. Due to its 
responsibility for the ENP as the main area where external migration policy is implemented, 
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focus is set on DG RELEX.  
3 Interviews DG RELEX, 7 December 2007 and AIDCO, 11 December 2007.  
4 Interview Council DG JHA, 10 December 2007. 
5 Interviews Commission Delegations Ukraine, 20 April 2008 and Morocco, 21 November 
2008. 
6 Interviews DG AIDCO and JLS, 4 December 2008 and Commission Delegation Morocco, 
21 November 2008. 
7 Interview DG AIDCO, 4 December 2007. 
8 Interview UNHCR Morocco, 2 December 2008 and Commission Delegation Morocco, 21 
November 2008. 
9 Interviews Commission Delegations Ukraine, 20 April 2008 and Morocco, 21 November 
2008, DG AIDCO 11 December 2007, IOM 3 Aril 2008 and UNHCR 2 December 2008. 
10 Including contributions form EU member states, IOM’s dependence is even greater with a 
total of USD219.8million or 22 percent following IOM’s Financial Report 2009, pp. 4, 44. 
11 Interview IOM Brussels, 19 December 2007. 
12 Contributions of EU member states and the Commission amount to 39.8 percent of the 
governmental contributions with US$636million (UNHCR, Donors 2009, 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c26c.html, retrieved 24 July 2010). 
13 Interview IOM Brussels, 19 December 2007. 
14 Interviews DGs RELEX and JLS, 7 December 2007 and Italian Embassy to Morocco, 19 
November 2008. 
15 Interviews DG JLS, 7 December 2007 and IOM Brussels, 19 December 2007. 
16 Interviews UNHCR Morocco, 12 December 2007 and Ukraine, 17 April 2008. 
17 Interview UNHCR Ukraine, 17 April 2008. 
18 Interviews IOM Brussels, 19 December 2007 and Ukraine, 3 April 2008. 
19 See http://www.iom.md/materials/press_060628.html and 
http://www.iom.md/materials/13_diaspora_seminar_recommend_eng.pdf, 
http://www.iom.md/materials/press/press_release_03_07_2008_eng.pdf 
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